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*
Abstract
Individuals’ risk preferences are estimated and employed in a variety of settings, notably
including choices in financial, labor, and product markets.  Recent work, especially in financial
economics, provides estimates of individuals’ coefficients of relative risk aversion (CRRA’s) in
excess of one, and often significantly higher.  However, it can be shown that high CRRA’s imply
equally high values for the income elasticity of the value of a statistical life.  Yet estimates of this
elasticity, derived from labor and product markets, are in the range of 0.5 to 0.6.  Furthermore, it
turns out that even a CRRA below one is difficult to reconcile with these elasticity estimates. 
Thus, there appears to be an important (additional) anomaly involving individuals’ risk-taking
behavior in different market settings.1For example, the work surveyed in Mehra and Prescott (1985) in their presentation of the equity premium
puzzle finds CRRA’s in the range from near 0 to 2.
2See, for example, Blake (1996), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Campbell (1996, 2003),
Kocherlakota (1996), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Palsson (1996).
3See, for example, Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) (survey on willingness to gamble on lifetime
income) and Mankiw (1985) (consumption spending).  Some studies report lower CRRA’s.  See, for example, Choi
and Menezes (1992) (discussing wide range of estimates in earlier literature, some below one; article examines
willingness to accept gambles and suggests the implausibility of CRRA’s below one and the probably that they are
much greater than one) and Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) (life insurance purchases; median estimate of 0.888 and
mean estimate of 3.735).
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I.  Introduction
Individuals’ risk preferences have an important influence on a wide variety of behavior,
ranging from portfolio selection to occupational choice.  Arrow (1971, pp. 97-98), in his seminal
work on behavior under uncertainty, suggested on grounds of boundedness of the utility function
that individuals’ coefficients of relative risk aversion (CRRA’s) should be approximately 1.  For
a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function, this implies that utility would depend on the log
of income, so that when income doubled, marginal utility would be halved.  Subsequently, Maitel
(1973) suggested that a range of evidence favored an estimate of CRRA of approximately 1.5,
and other earlier work suggested similarly low values for CRRA.
1
More recently, a growing body of empirical work, especially in financial economics,
provides estimates of the value of individuals’s CRRA’s that exceed earlier suggestions.  Most of
this work indicates a CRRA of 2 or more, and some, including that attempting to reconcile the
equity risk premium with rational behavior, indicates that individuals’ CRRA’s may be above
10.
2  Similarly high estimates are also reported in studies of risk-taking behavior in other
markets.
3
Separate bodies of empirical work study individuals’ risk-taking behavior in labor,
product, and housing markets, examining compensating wage differentials or individuals’
willingness to pay for safer products or homes in areas with lower environmental hazards.  An
important strand of this literature measures the value of a statistical life (VSL) based on
individuals’ tradeoffs between wages or prices on one hand and job or product safety on the
other.  Researchers have long recognized that VSL will depend positively on income.  Viscusi
and Aldy (2003) survey the large body of pertinent literature and extend it through their own- 2 -
meta-analysis, finding that the income elasticity of VSL is in the range 0.5 to 0.6, with the upper
bound of the 95 percent confidence interval falling below 1.0.
It is worth considering whether estimates of individuals’ behavior in risky situations are
consistent across contexts.  A priori, one would suppose that the same individuals, with the same
utility functions, should display similar risk-taking behavior in different settings.  What does not
seem to have been recognized, however, is that CRRA’s, estimated by financial economists and
others, have particular implications for the income elasticity of VSL, measured in studies of labor
and product markets (and conversely).
The connection between CRRA and the income elasticity of VSL is fundamental and can
be understood intuitively as follows.  VSL depends (in significant part) on the marginal utility
cost of expenditures to protect one’s life.  It follows from this that the income elasticity of VSL
will depend on how the marginal utility cost of such expenditures varies with income, which is to
say on the rate at which the marginal utility of income falls as income rises.  An individual’s
CRRA is a measure of that rate.
To illustrate this relationship between CRRA and the income elasticity of VSL, consider
again the case in which the CRRA is constant and equal to 1.  When utility thus equals the log of
income, marginal utility equals the inverse of income.  Therefore, if an individual’s income
doubles, marginal utility and hence the utility cost of a precautionary expenditure that reduces the
risk of death falls to half the prior level, so individuals with twice the income would on this
account be willing to pay twice as much for a given safety measure.  This factor taken alone
suggests an income elasticity of VSL equal to 1 when CRRA is equal to 1; likewise, when CRRA
equals 2, 10, or some higher value, the income elasticity of VSL should on this account equal 2,
10, or that higher value, respectively.
There is, however, another effect of income on VSL: the value of preserving one’s life is
higher when income is higher, because utility is accordingly higher.  This suggests that the
income elasticity of VSL should tend to exceed CRRA.  It turns out that this second effect is
rather small when CRRA is large (a high CRRA implies that the marginal utility of income falls
rapidly, so total utility rises little as income increases), but this effect is larger when CRRA is
low.  Indeed, it turns out that very low values of CRRA (well below 1) do not necessarily (or
even probably) imply that the income elasticity of VSL is below 1, so estimates of this elasticity
in the empirical literature, which are about half the lowest value apparently obtainable from
utility-maximization, seem difficult to reconcile with rational behavior.
More important for present purposes, the low estimates of this income elasticity – tightly
clustered in the range of 0.5 to 0.6 – which in theory are an upper bound on CRRA, seem quite
inconsistent with the high estimates of CRRA – at least 2 and perhaps 10 or more – obtained in
the financial economics and other literatures.  Thus, there appears to be an important anomaly
involving individuals’ risk-taking behavior in different market settings, one that exists even if
one accepts the lower estimates of CRRA that researchers find most plausible.  Of course, it is
hardly novel to suggest that individuals’ behavior under uncertainty may not be fully rational
and, in particular, may exhibit inconsistencies in different contexts.  Nevertheless, the new4The model (in particular the extension that allows for a bequest motive) can readily be interpreted as
applying as well to risks of injury rather than death.  Though there is less empirical work on the subject, estimates of
the income elasticity of the value of statistical occupational injuries reported in Viscusi and Evans (1990) are in the
range 0.6 to 1.0, similar to the values for the income elasticity of VSL, thereby reinforcing the anomaly discussed in
the text.
5The second-order condition holds globally, justifying later substitutions using this first-order condition. 
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anomaly identified here seems significant, and its exploration may contribute to the range of
efforts that seek to improve our understanding of risk-taking behavior.
The foregoing heuristic analysis of the relationship between the income elasticity of VSL
and CRRA is formalized in a model in section II.
4  Section III presents extensions and discusses
how the analytical results relate to the pertinent empirical literatures.  Section IV concludes.
II.  Analysis
Individuals are assumed to choose expenditures x that reduce the probability p(x) of
death, pN(x) < 0 and pO(x) > 0, to maximize their expected utility
where y is exogenous income and u is a concave function of consumption, c  = y - x.  (The
possibility of a bequest motive is considered in section III.)  An individual’s first-order condition
regarding the choice of x is
5
where uN = du/dc.
Expression (2) can readily be transformed into an expression for VSL.
The numerator on the right side is simply the utility benefit of saving one’s life, and the
denominator is the marginal utility cost (in units of utility per dollar), so the ratio gives the value
of a statistical life (in dollars).
Clearly, because u depends on exogenous income y, so does VSL.  Let 0 denote the
elasticity of VSL with respect to y, that is,- 4 -
To analyze this elasticity, we first find
where xy = dx/dy indicates how individuals adjust their investment in reducing the probability of
death as their income rises.  Combining expressions (3)-(5),
In the third term on the right side of (6), one can substitute for pN using the first-order condition
(2), simplify, and combine with the first term to yield
Examining expression (7), the first term (ignoring the 1-2xy for the moment) looks much
like the elasticity of utility with respect to income, 0uy.  More precisely, however, the utility and
marginal utility in (7) correspond to u rather than U.  And the second term (ignoring the 1-xy for
the moment) looks like the CRRA, though again the utilities in (7) involve u rather than U.  This
suggests that it would be illuminating – and better relate to empirical estimates – to restate (7) in
terms of 0uy and CRRA.
To begin, using expression (1), we can evaluate the derivatives of U with respect to y,
which are as follows:
and
In (8), xy does not appear on account of the envelope theorem – i.e., the xy terms drop out when
we substitutes for pN using the first-order condition for x, expression (2).  In (9), the first-order
condition (2) is used to substitute for pN.- 5 -
Using (8) and (9), we can express 0uy and CRRA – with each defined in terms of the
derivatives of U with respect to y – as follows (after appropriate substitutions and
simplifications):
and
We can now use expressions (10) and (11) to write expression (7) as follows:
The two terms on the right side of expression (12) correspond to the two effects identified
in the introduction.  First, as income rises, the utility value of saving one’s life rises at a rate
indicated by 0uy, the elasticity of utility with respect to income.  This effect is weighted by 1-xy
because some of one’s increased income is spent on safety and this expenditure does not
contribute to utility directly.  Second, as income rises, the cost, measured in utility, of safety
expenditures falls at a rate indicated by the CRRA (which is (the negative of) the elasticity of the
marginal utility of income with respect to income).
To assist in interpreting expression (12) quantitatively, we will make a crude
approximation, namely, by assuming that xy will be close zero.  (This approximation is discussed
further in section III.)  This allows us to write the income elasticity of VSL as
For concreteness, it is also useful to consider constant relative risk aversion utility
functions.  To begin, consider the case in which CRRA = 1, that is, u = ln c, where, recall, c
(consumption) is y - x.  For this case, we have6This assumes, plausibly (see section III) that individuals do not spend virtually all increases in income on
x.
7It is helpful to multiply the numerator and denominator of the first term in (11) by c
"-1 and to rearrange
terms to yield
For " > 1, as y and thus c become large, c
"-1-1 approaches infinity, so the first term in (15) approaches zero from
above (subject to the caveat in note 6).
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The first term is strictly positive.  As y and thus c become large, the term approaches zero.
6  For a
reasonable range of income levels, the first term – ignoring the difference between y and c, which
only makes it somewhat larger – is close to 0.1, so 0 . 1.1.  (For example, for c = 10,000,
1/(ln c) . 0.11, and for c = 100,000, 1/(ln c) . 0.09.)  Thus, in this simple case, our
approximation of the elasticity of VSL with respect to income is substantially in excess – about
double – the typical magnitudes obtained in the literature of 0.5 to 0.6.
To generalize, consider other constant CRRA utility functions of the form u = (c
1-"-1)/(1-
"), for "  1.  Now we have
For low levels of CRRA, specifically, for " < 1, the first components of the first term in (15)
approach y/c (from above) as y and thus c become large.  Unless y is significantly greater than c
(i.e., x is a high fraction of income, which we implicitly assumed is not the case in making the
approximation in (13); see section III), our approximation for 0 approaches 1 (from above). 
Hence, the result – that 0 is (perhaps slightly) greater than 1.0 – is not appreciably different from
that in the case in which " = 1.  (To reinforce the intuition about why low values of CRRA do
not imply that 0 < 1, consider the case of risk neutrality, in which " = 0.  The second term in (15)
equals zero, but the first term slightly exceeds y/c, which in turn exceeds one: as income rises,
the marginal utility cost of expenditures to increase safety does not fall at all, but the utility value
of the life one might save is rising roughly proportionately in this case.)
Finally – and of particular interest given the high empirical estimates of CRRA – consider
the case in which " > 1.  For nontrivial values of c, c
1-"-1 < 0, and 1-" < 0; hence, the first term is
positive.  Further analysis reveals that, as y and thus c become large, the first term approaches
zero (from above).
7  As a consequence, our approximation for 0 is (slightly) greater than the
value of ".  Thus, if one accepts moderate estimates for CRRA, say 2, or much larger estimates,
the inconsistency with the estimated value of the income elasticity of VSL (0.5 - 0.6) is striking.8This model is similar to that in Viscusi (1994).
9Let uL = u.  Now, in the first term on the right side of (12'), 1-8 will appear in each of the numerator and denominator, which cancels.
10See, for example, Davies (1996), Masson and Pestieau (1997), and Stark (1995).
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III.  Extensions and Discussion
A.  Bequest Motive
The analysis in section II assumed that individuals’ obtain no utility if they die.  To
incorporate a bequest motive, one can revise expression (1) for expected utility as follows:
where uL and uD are concave state-contingent functions of consumption in the states in which the
individual lives and dies, respectively.
8  As shown in the Appendix, if one undertakes analysis
parallel to that in section II for this more general case, one obtains
The only difference between expressions (12') and (12) is that, in the first term, in place of 0uy in
expression (12) – which from (11) equaled yuN/u – we have in expression (12'), in place of uN and
u, the difference in these values between the two states.
To interpret expression (12'), it is useful to consider briefly the case in which, for some
8 0 [0,1), uD = 8uL.  That is, utility in state D, if positive, is taken to be proportional to (and lower
than) utility in state L.  It is straightforward to show that, under this assumption, expression (12')
reduces precisely to expression (12), restoring our original result.
9  The intuition for this
conclusion is that 0 depends only on how pertinent terms reflecting differences between the two
states change as income rises; as long as an individual’s utilities in the two states are in fixed
proportions, the manner in which the relevant differences change with income is the same
regardless of the particular proportion (including the case in which the proportion is zero, that is,
the original case in which there is no bequest motive).
There is, however, no a priori basis for this particular assumption of fixed proportions,
and empirical evidence on bequest motives has not been able to pin down even the functional
form, much less the pertinent magnitudes, regarding the utility of bequests.
10  It does seem
plausible, however, to conjecture that the utility value of consumption in the death state, at least
for some individuals, is not subject to as rapid diminishing returns as is utility in the life state. 
Consider, for example, cases in which the bequest motive is altruistic and involves children, of
which there are many, or charities.  The first term on the right side of expression (12') indicates
that this alternative assumption implies a lower value of 0.  But as long as we suppose that the
marginal utility of income in the life state remains higher than in the death state, the first term11If xy  >  1, this term would instead approach zero from below.
12Indeed, whenever xy is constant, these two components will precisely cancel, for the first, y/c, simply
equals y/(y-x), and the second, 1-xy, then is 1-(x/y), which equals (y-x)/y.
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will remain positive, in which case the value of CRRA continues to place a lower bound on 0. 
Thus, it is conceivable that bequest motives could help to explain why estimates of 0 are slightly
lower than suggested in section II, but unless CRRA is substantially less than 1, it still seems
difficult to explain estimates of 0 in the range 0.5 to 0.6.
B.  Assumption that xy . 0
In moving from expression (12) to the approximation in expression (13), it was assumed
that xy roughly equals zero when in fact it is positive – which is intuitive (expenditures on
reducing the risk of death should rise with income) and would be straightforward to demonstrate. 
Thus, the discussion in the latter part of section II overstates the value of 0.  However, for values
of CRRA exceeding one, the entire first term was ignored (on the ground that it approaches zero,
from above, in any event
11), so this approximation is of little consequence in such cases. 
(Likewise, for CRRA equal to one, this term was small, pushing the value of 0 from one to a
slightly higher level.)
Furthermore, when CRRA is significantly below one, it also seems difficult to generate a
value of 0 that is significantly less than one – and thus in the range of empirical estimates – even
if the value of xy is large.  For example, suppose that " = 0.2 and, moreover, that xy = 0.5 (i.e.,
that half of all increases in income are spent reducing the risk of death).  In expression (15), the
first term, with 1-", which now equals 0.8, will be weighted by 1-xy, equal to 0.5 in this case, to
produce a value of only 0.4.  Furthermore, the immediately preceding component of the first
term, as noted previously, will approach 1 for high values of y and thus of c.  However, when xy
is large, the first component of the first term, y/c, is no longer close to 1, as assumed above. 
Here, if one assumes for example that xy = 0.5 at all levels of y, y/c will equal 2.  As a result, the
first term will be approximately 0.8 as before – the effects of y/c and of 1-xy precisely cancelling
– so the total value of 0, adding in the second term which here is 0.2, is again approximately
1.0.
12  For 0 to fall significantly below 1.0 on account of xy being significantly greater than zero
(and CRRA being very low), therefore, it would also be necessary for xy to be low for lower
values of y but to become large in the relevant range.  If, in our example with " = 0.2 and
xy = 0.5, one also made the extreme assumption that y/c was nevertheless close to 1.0, then for
high incomes the value of 0 would approach 0.60, which is in the range of the empirical
estimates.
Of course, the empirical literature on CRRA’s does not support such low estimates of ". 
Moreover, empirical evidence most closely related to xy, that concerning how health expenditures
rise with income, does not suggest high values of xy.  Estimates reported in Viscusi (1994)
indicate values on the order of 0.1 or perhaps smaller.  In sum, the approximation made in
moving from expression (12) to expression (13) does not contribute significantly to the main
result herein.13More precisely: “For the OLS specifications, the income elasticity varies from 0.49 to 0.60.  The 95
percent confidence intervals never range below 0.2 and never exceed 0.95.  For the robust regression specifications,
the income elasticity varies from 0.46 to 0.48.  The 95 percent confidence intervals never fall below 0.15 and never
exceed 0.78.”
14Indirect evidence appears in Bernheim, Carman, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (2001), which indicates that the
extent of financial vulnerability from the death of a spouse is lower (in part due to life insurance coverage) for
individuals in higher income groups.
15Considering that estimates of VSL are in the range of $4 to $7 million (Viscusi and Aldy 2003) whereas
individuals at the income level of those in such studies typically have life insurance of no more than a few hundred
thousand dollars, the moral hazard effect is almost certainly small; hence, the extent to which it might change with
income could not plausibly be very significant.
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C.  Empirical estimates of 0
The foregoing analysis indicates that, as a matter of rational behavior, we would expect 0
to be at least 1 and, if empirical estimates of CRRA are to be believed, possibly far greater.  This
may be juxtaposed against the empirical evidence bearing on 0.  Notably, Viscusi and Aldy
(2003, p. 44) state: “Based on the approximately 50 wage-risk studies from 10 countries, we can
conclude from these results that the income elasticity for the value of a statistical life is less than
1.0.  Across a number of specifications with our data, our point estimates of the income elasticity
range between about 0.5 and 0.6.  Note that in none of our specifications did the income
elasticity’s 95 percent confidence interval upper bound exceed 1.0.”
13
Despite the apparent confidence in these estimates as an econometric matter, perhaps
there are aspects of the underlying behavior that produce a substantial downward bias.  One
possibility might be that individuals are imperfectly informed, greatly underestimating the
pertinent risks, or that they behave myopically.  There is, however, a difficulty with such an
explanation: it implies that estimates of VSL itself are biased downward but carries no immediate
implication for estimates of the elasticity of VSL with respect to income.  Moreover, if one had
to make a conjecture, it seems plausible that such biases would become less severe as income
rises.  That is, individuals who are better informed, better processors of information, and in
particular less myopic and thus more inclined to invest in their own human capital, would tend to
have higher rather than lower incomes.  If so, as income rises, the degree of downward bias in
estimated VSL would fall, which would produce empirical estimates of the income elasticity of
VSL that were biased upward relative to values that reflect rational, fully informed
decisionmaking.
Other possibilities might also be explored.  For example, life insurance – by making the
state involving death more attractive (or, put more gently, less unattractive), will produce moral
hazard with regard to market decisions, such as occupational choices and product purchases (if
insurance premiums do not fully reflect such choices).  This too would cause estimates of VSL
drawn from observed behavior to be biased downward.  In this instance, it might be more
plausible to imagine that the effect rises with income, if the relative extent (not absolute amount)
of insurance coverage rises with income.
14  Then, empirical estimates of the income elasticity of
VSL would be biased downward.  Even if this is true, it is difficult to imagine a sufficient
downward bias to reconcile estimates of 0 with the high measured values of CRRA.
1516See, for example, Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Campbell (2003),
Constantinides (1990), Epstein and Zin (1990), McGrattan and Prescott (2003), and Shrikhande (1997).  For a
skeptical view of the success of most such attempts, see Kocherlakota (1996).
17Palsson (1996) finds no significant correlation between income or wealth and CRRA and also surveys the
mixed evidence in prior literature which tends, perhaps, to favor a view that CRRA does not vary greatly with
income.  By contrast, Blake (1996) finds that CRRA’s are much higher for poorer investors than for rich investors.
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Perhaps additional explanations could be adduced.  Of course, biases in measuring VSL
and its elasticity with respect to income are important in their own right.  However, the attempt to
reconcile such estimates with evidence on high values for CRRA – and with a model of rational
behavior that strongly suggests that regardless of CRRA, 0 should be at least equal to 1 –
provides further motivation for exploring the issue.
D.  Empirical estimates of CRRA
As noted in the introduction, empirical estimates of CRRA have been derived in the
financial economics literature – notably in attempts to explain the equity premium puzzle – and
in various other literatures.  In most more recent work, estimates of CRRA exceed 2 and a
number of them exceed 10.  Some literature has suggested various adjustments to individuals’
utility functions and has introduced other features in attempts to explain equity premiums with
what many view as more plausible estimates of CRRA, namely, single-digit estimates, often
closer to 2 rather than substantially higher values.
16  If, indeed, CRRA is close to 2, the extent of
the discrepancy with estimates of the income elasticity of VSL is greatly reduced, but hardly
eliminated.  And if those income elasticity estimates are not substantially off, perhaps work in
financial economics and other fields should attempt to reconcile their empirical evidence with a
value of CRRA closer to 1.
Another possibility is that CRRA is not constant at different income levels and the
measures of CRRA in the different literatures involve individuals who, on average, are at
different levels of income.  Specifically, estimates of the income elasticity of VSL tend to be
derived from data on ordinary workers who probably have lower incomes than individuals who
would be marginal investors.  However, there is no strong evidence that CRRA rises with income
or wealth; it may even be decreasing, which would add to the difficulty of reconciling these
disparate results.
17
IV.  Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the view that theoretical and empirical work on individuals’
risk-taking behavior ought to be reconciled across contexts.  It turns out that individuals’
CRRA’s – typically estimated and employed in the study of behavior in financial and some other
markets – have direct implications for the income elasticity of VSL (and conversely) – typically
examined in the study of behavior in labor and product markets.  In the model analyzed here, it is
shown that the income elasticity of VSL should, roughly, be as high as the CRRA (and plausibly
higher, at least equal to 1, if the CRRA is below 1).  Yet estimates of the income elasticity of
VSL across a range of studies seem to cluster tightly in the range 0.5 to 0.6 whereas estimates of- 11 -
CRRA tend to be at least 2, with some estimates exceeding 10.  This discrepancy suggests the
existence of a previously unrecognized (additional) anomaly concerning individuals’ risk-taking
behavior in different market settings.
This paper raises more questions than it answers.  It may be that individuals in fact
behave quite inconsistently in different contexts, in which case the causes of this divergence
should be explored.  Alternatively, the estimates in one of these literatures may be off
substantially.  Finally, the present model may not adequately capture some important factor that
might explain the gap.  In any case, there seems to be value in researchers paying greater
attention to the models and empirical results concerning individuals’ risk-taking behavior across
different settings.- 12 -
APPENDIX: EXTENSION FOR BEQUEST MOTIVE
As indicated by expression (1'), expected utility for this case is
The first-order condition for x now is
so we have
Analogous to expression (3), here the numerator is the difference between utility when alive and
when dead (the net value of life in utils), and the denominator is the average marginal utility of
income across the two states (the expected cost in utils of expenditures on life).
As before, to derive 0, we begin with dVSL/dy, which in this case is
Combining (A3), (A4), and the definition of 0 in (4), we have
To derive an expression for CRRA, we differentiate (A1), as follows:
and- 13 -
Thus, using the definition of CRRA in (11), we can write
Finally, substituting (A8) into the right side of (A5), we obtain
which is expression (12') in the text.- 14 -
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